## DECOMPOSITION ATTACKS OVER

UNIVERSITEES HYPERELLIPTIC CURVES
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## Motivations

- Algorithmic Number Theory
$\diamond$ Computations of discrete logs in abelian varieties in general
$\diamond$ Jacobian varieties of algebraic curves are abelian varieties
- Cryptography: Diffie-Hellman $\leq$ DLP, signature algorithms
$\diamond$ Elliptic curves $=$ abelian varieties of dimension 1
$\diamond$ Transfer attacks: elliptic curves $\longrightarrow$ hyperelliptic curves


## How to compute discrete logs ?

## $X$ Generic algorithms

$\checkmark$ Index-Calculus algorithms
How "better" are they?

## DECOMPOSITION ATTACK

Example over an elliptic curve $E\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{n}}\right)$ :
Given (many) $R \in E\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{n}}\right)$, find relations as $R=P_{1}+\cdots+P_{n}$.

- summation polynomials $\sim$ project group law on the $x$-line

$$
\begin{gathered}
P_{1}+P_{2}+P_{3}=0 \\
\text { algebra } \downarrow \quad \uparrow \text { geometry } \\
S_{3}\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}\right)=0
\end{gathered}
$$



- restriction of scalars gives polynomial systems

Take factor base $\mathcal{F}=\left\{P \in E\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{n}}\right): x_{P} \in \mathbb{F}_{q}\right\}$.

$$
\left\{\begin{array} { l } 
{ R = P _ { 1 } + \cdots + P _ { n } } \\
{ P _ { i } \in \mathcal { F } }
\end{array} \rightarrow \left\{\begin{array}{lc}
s_{1}\left(X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right)=0 & \text { Solve with } \\
\vdots & \text { Gröbner basis } \\
s_{n}\left(X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}\right)=0 & \text { computation }
\end{array}\right.\right.
$$

$\rightarrow \begin{cases}X_{1}+Q_{1}\left(X_{n}\right)=0 & \\ \vdots & \rightarrow \\ X_{n-1}+Q_{n-1}\left(X_{n}\right)=0 & \text { - Find roots of } U \text { over } \mathbb{F}_{q} \\ U\left(X_{n}\right)=X_{n}{ }^{D}+\ldots=0 & \\ \text { - Probability }(\text { root }) \sim \frac{1}{n!}\end{cases}$

## Contributions

## Improvements for decomposition attacks on hyperelliptic curves

## - Generalization of summation polynomials:

$\diamond$ Computational definition:

1. Description of $\mathcal{V}_{n, R}=\left\{\left(P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n}\right): \sum P_{i}=R\right\}$
2. Summation polynomials $=$ Gröbner basis of an elimination ideal
$\diamond$ Analysis of geometric and algebraic structure

- Codim $\mathcal{V}_{n, R}=$ genus
- $\operatorname{deg} \mathcal{V}_{n, R}=2^{n-\text { genus }}$
$\diamond$ Exploited in a new decomposition attack over hyperelliptic curves
- In characteristic 2:
$\diamond$ Reduction of $D$ using Frobenius action
- Reduction factor: at least $2^{n-1}$, up to $2^{(n-1)(\text { genus+1) }}$
$\diamond$ Decomposition attacks now practical for more parameters
- Harvesting over a meaningful curve


## Index Calculus for Jacobian varieties



## PoSSo with Gröbner bases

| Original System | $\longrightarrow$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { DRL } \\ \text { basis } \\ \text { F4, F5 } \end{gathered}$ | $\longrightarrow$ | Change order FGLM | $\longrightarrow$ | Univariate Solving |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\Delta$ : degree of regularity |  | D: \#solutions in alg. closure |  |  |
| $n$ variables <br> $s$ equations |  | $O\left(s\binom{n+\Delta}{\Delta}^{\omega}\right)$ |  | $O\left(n D^{\omega}\right)$ |  |  |

## In

Decomposition $\quad \Delta=\tilde{O}\left(D^{1 / n}\right) \quad D=2^{n(n-1) \text { genus }}$ attacks

Find 1 relation $=O((n \cdot$ genus $)!\times D)$
Reduction: for elliptic curves: [2, 3]; for hyperelliptic curves: this work

## Impact of the Reduction

For genus $=2, n=3, D=2^{12}=4096$, reduced degree $D=2^{6}=64$.

- Toy-example for one try:

| Fields | Tool | Time for $D$ | Time for $D$ | Ratio |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbb{F}_{2^{45}} \mid \mathbb{F}_{2^{15}}$ | Magma 2.19 | 1500 s | 0.029 s | $\mathbf{7 5 0 0 0}$ |

- Meaningful harvesting: \#target group $\sim 2^{184}$, using 8000 cores:

$$
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text { Field } & \text { Tool } & \text { old } & \text { this work } \\
\mathbb{F}_{2^{93}} \mid \mathbb{F}_{2^{31}} & \mathrm{C} & \sim \text { (optimized) } & \text { unfeasible }
\end{array}
$$

Linalg: $\sim 2^{56}$ operations: whole algorithm is practical.

## References

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